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Abstract: This paper addresses the impact of financialisation on the systems of
provision (SoPs) drawing on a series of case studies in housing and water – both
non-financial sectors. In order to understand this more fully, the paper first
considers some of the theoretical constructs connecting money, commodities and
finance, exploring the theories of money, the extension of that theory to finance and
the specification of the processes attaching finance to the non-financial. The paper
shows that both case-study sectors have increasingly been subject to market forms
with, for example, land markets in housing and cost recovery practices in water
provision. However there are different forms of monetary relations across the case
studies. Simply to equate financialisation with commodification would be misleading.
The diversity of arrangements across sectors and locations is addressed in the
paper by making the distinction between commodification (production for private
profits), the commodity form (periodic payments for a good or service in the absence
of a profit motive) and commodity calculation (application of a monetary logic without
money changing hands). Each of these is associated with different forms of
marketization and “market forces” but they are underpinned by different economic
and social structures.
The paper then goes on to tie these insights to financialisation and contemporary
capitalism more generally with reference to the case studies. For housing there is
variegation in the extent to which the expansion of finance coincides with expansion
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of material provision, as shown with for example the different outcomes from
expanding lending for house production as opposed to mortgage lending for
consumption. In water, there is diversity in the extent and nature of privatisation and
this has led to differences in the extent and depth of financial intervention across the
case studies. England and Wales lies at one extreme with heavily entrenched
financialisation while this is considerably less significant in the case studies with
less privatisation. The final section of this paper considers the implication of the
different forms of financialisation for economic and social reproduction including
gender.
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1. Introduction
This paper is one of three thematic papers based on a collection of case studies
which examined the systems of provision (SoP) for water and housing in five selected
locations: UK, Poland, Portugal, South Africa and Istanbul. This paper also draws on
findings presented in the sectoral synthesis papers.1 These three thematic papers
reflect on how the empirical findings from the case studies relate to some of the
broader themes of the FESSUD research programme. This thematic paper
addresses the theme of financialisation in the context of the five country case studies
of housing and water. The case studies provide detailed analyses of the role of
finance in the SoPs which demonstrate how financialisation works in practice in
these two non-financial sectors. In this paper, we attempt to tease out the
implications of these accounts for our understanding of financialisation, both as real
economic phenomenon (financialisation) and as area of scholarship
(“financialisation”).
Beginning with the latter, we argue that much existing literature on financialisation
lacks a coherent theoretical foundation. While theory is not absent from the large
and expanding literature on financialisation, it is often imputed from elsewhere,
implicitly and without reflection. We have elsewhere advocated the SoP approach,
which investigates financialisation by looking at the role and impact of finance on the
concrete chain of activities that underpin production and consumption, Bayliss et al
(2013). The case studies demonstrate the merits of the approach - by analysing
financialisation through SoPs the case studies are able to grasp the commodity- and
location-specific forms taken by processes of financialisation. In this paper we turn
to a more abstract level of analysis, in order, on the one hand, to draw on the case
study results to deepen our understanding of financialisation in general and, on the
other, to give those case studies a deeper theoretical foundation.
5This project has received funding from the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme
for research, technological development and demonstration under grant agreement no 266800
The case studies show that financialisation has been associated with the increasing
presence of the “market” or “market forces” in the provision of housing and water.
In short, as finance is underpinned by money and commodity relations, so
financialisation is underpinned by commodification. A deeper theorisation of
financialisation must therefore begin with a relatively abstract understanding of the
relationships between money, commodities, and finance, requiring a theory of
money, the extension of that theory to finance, and the specification of the processes
attaching finance to the non-financial.
A closer look, however, reveals the nature of the “markets” for housing and water to
be highly differentiated, with respect to both each other and across the different
case studies. Further, that differentiation has significant implications for how those
sectors relate to financialisation, and for how we understand the latter. We suggest
that the differentiated market forms identified in the case studies can be grasped by
distinguishing between commodification as such (production for private profit), the
commodity form (periodic payments for a good or service, in the absence of the profit
motive) and commodity calculation (application of a monetary logic, though without
money changing hands). Each of these categories is then shown to vary in terms of
how far they facilitate financialisation. We suggest that the application of these
categories to housing and water can be used to illustrate and explain variegated
outcomes across countries and sectors, and discuss their multiple and complex
relations to financialisation.
Our approach to money and commodification serves as the basis for a more general
discussion of financialisation, which traces the emergence of new opportunities for
financial profit. In particular, we argue that the proliferation of assets and asset
trading has led to dramatic restructuring of social and economic life. Consequently,
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many distinguishing features and effects of financialisation – including the
encroachment of finance into more areas of social and economic life and the
expansion of fictitious capital at the expense of the real economy – can be
understood in these terms.
We begin in the next section by discussing theoretical characteristics of the existing
literature on financialisation, drawing attention to a lack of coherence and self-
reflection. In the following section we argue that an abstract understanding of
financialisation, given the latter’s systemic properties, needs to be rooted in a
universal theory of money, and outline our categories for the different forms of
monetised interactions. In section four we look at the role of money in generating
new forms of profit-making though the financial sector, and the consequent
expansion of that sector at the expense of the real economy. Section five explains
how this leads to financialisation’s encroachment on social and economic
reproduction, and section six discusses the implications of this for gender. Section
seven concludes.
2. A New Term is Borne and Born
Over the course of the financial crisis (or crises) and subsequent global recession,
the term “financialisation” has experienced a considerable growth in usage, one that
seems set to continue for the foreseeable future. This is to be contrasted with its
negligible presence previously. Although deployed for slightly longer within political
economy, Arrighi (1994) most notably, Goldstein (2009) views the idea as having a
significant presence only over the last decade.2 Within the discipline of economics,
its origins and continuing trajectory remain confined to the heavily marginalised
fields of heterodox economics. Otherwise, if not quite a scholarly “buzzword”,3 it has
found some purchase across the social sciences more generally, and is possibly in
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danger of attaining the status of a “fuzzword”.4 Specifically, it has been deployed with
different meanings and with different methods and theories. In this respect, it
carries a similar burden as more longstanding concepts such as globalisation,
neoliberalism, and social capital, and has, significantly, overlapped with at least the
first two of these.5
Three fundamental features, then, mark this rise of financialisation across the social
sciences. One is the frequent observation of neglect of finance in the past.6 Typical,
for example, is Pike and Pollard (2010, p. 29), for whom there are, “long-standing
concerns about the relatively marginal location of finance in economic geography”.7
Similarly, Moran and Payne (2014, p. 335) observe the limited attention to (the power
of) finance in political science due to its primary concern with the state:
In sum, with economics asserting a monopoly in the study of economic life and
international political economy largely content with overarching analyses of global
trends, political science was able, on the whole successfully, to assert and claim its
own monopoly, so to speak, of the study of the state, and to do it, as we have seen, in
its own distinctive way.
Notwithstanding diversity of foci within the field (see, for example, Kemeny and Lowe
(1998), the same is true of housing studies, where an exponential increase in
literature on mortgage markets is a relatively new phenomenon. Similarly with
water, and infrastructure more generally, finance attracted little attention until the
last decade when deficiencies in provision began to be increasingly depicted in terms
of a “financing gap”.
A second feature of the privatisation literature, possibly in an understandable
reaction against an unavoidable sense of neglect in the wake of recent events, has
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been the wide variety of approaches taken to financialisation, from pointing to the
neo-liberal subject variously as worker, consumer, entrepreneur, investor as in
Langley (2007) and similarly within the “state of the art” of van der Zwan (2014), who
sees financialisation as straddling approaches to the nature of contemporary
capitalism, shareholder value and everyday life. This breadth is reproduced in
relation to housing, which has been implicated in both macroeconomic restructuring
and the reconstitution of individual subjectivities, Crouch (2009) and Van Gent (2010).
In water, financialisation has often been related to enclosing the commons and
financial involvement in natural resources (see for example, Friends of the Earth
(2013). The political economy of the financial sector in the provision of water has only
recently been the subject of academic scholarship, Bayliss (2013) and Allen and
Pryke (2013). Third, closely related but distinct, is the equally wide variety of subject
matter covered by financialisation, dealing in everything from the nature of the
relationship between financialisation and neoliberalism in characterising
contemporary capitalism to the eponymous influence of financialisation on everyday
life, let alone as a generic term for finance itself, Sawyer (2014). Housing and water
appear in this context as two examples among many areas whose subjection to
financialisation has been the subject of investigation.
No doubt, much of this is a consequence of the, now acknowledged, increasing
pervasiveness and diversity of finance in general, however it is understood, with an
equally compelling fluidity and innovation attached to financialisation (as with other
‘grand’ concepts). Quoting at length for completeness, Ashman and Fine (2013, pp.
156/7):
In brief, financialisation has involved: the phenomenal expansion of financial assets
relative to real activity (by three times over the last thirty years); the proliferation of
types of assets, from derivatives through to futures markets with a corresponding
explosion of acronyms; the absolute and relative expansion of speculative as
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opposed to or at the expense of real investment; a shift in the balance of productive
to financial imperatives within the private sector whether financial or not; increasing
inequality in income arising out of weight of financial rewards; consumer-led booms
based on credit; the penetration of finance into ever more areas of economic and
social life such as pensions, education, health, and provision of economic and social
infrastructure; the emergence of a neo-liberal culture of reliance upon markets and
private capital and corresponding anti-statism despite the extent to which the
rewards to private finance have in part derived from state finance itself.
Financialisation is also associated with the continued role of the US dollar as world
money despite, at least in the global crisis of the noughties, its deficits in trade,
capital account, the fiscus, and consumer spending, and minimal rates of interest.
And, however financialisation is defined, its consequences have been perceived to
be: reductions in overall levels and efficacy of real investment as financial
instruments and activities expand at its expense even if excessive investment does
take place in particular sectors at particular times (as with the dotcom bubble of a
decade ago); prioritising shareholder value, or financial worth, over other economic
and social values; pushing of policies towards conservatism and commercialisation
in all respects; extending influence of finance more broadly, both directly and
indirectly, over economic and social policy; placing more aspects of economic and
social life at the risk of volatility from financial instability and, conversely, places the
economy and social life at risk of crisis from triggers within particular markets (as
with the food and energy crises that preceded the financial crisis). Whilst, then,
financialisation is a single word, it is attached to a wide variety of different forms and
effects of finance with the USA and the UK to the fore. And, even if exposed in acute
form by the crisis, its expansion over the last few decades has been at the expense of
the real economy despite otherwise extraordinarily favourable “fundamentals” for
capitalism in terms of availability of new technologies, expansion and weakening of
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global and national labour forces, and the triumph of neoliberalism in political and
policy arenas. financialisation
Significantly, then, as proposed by Lee et al (2009, p. 727-8), in locating it
geographically, “financialisation is hardly a new phenomenon in circuits of capital.
What is perhaps relatively new is the extent to which finance has found its way into
most, if not all, of the nooks and crannies of social life. To illustrate, it is easily
possible to identify at least 17 notions of financialisation”, emphasis added.
Both housing and water offer up their own array of phenomena attached to
financialisation. Following Robertson (2015), most conspicuous for housing is a vast
expansion of mortgage lending, which has ensnared households in financial
markets. Concomitant on this has been, on the one hand, the growth of secondary
mortgage markets trading assets underpinned by mortgage repayments and, on the
other, attempts to reconstitute individuals as neoliberal saver-investors (with partial
success). More generally, housing provision has been increasingly governed by a
commitment to market forms, which is not to say that states have not intervened,
only that their interventions are constrained by a presumption against state
provision and in favour of at times elusive market forms. This commitment is
reflected, for example, in land markets. While states continue to intervene heavily in
these markets via planning regulations, their interventions are increasingly dictated
by allocating land to its highest value – in monetary terms – use. This shift has
coincided with a growth in the importance of real estate investment in the broader
economy, itself a facet of the ascendance of speculative over real investment.
Water, as a natural resource, seems to be far removed from the financial sector.
Certainly the scope and nature of financialisation is more opaque than in housing. In
most countries, water is provided by the state, and financial interventions are limited
11
This project has received funding from the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme
for research, technological development and demonstration under grant agreement no 266800
to bond issues with some hedging of interest rate and currency fluctuations. State
water providers have increasingly been required to restructure themselves as
independent water companies and to adopt private sector style financial
management but privatisation has not been widespread in the case studies. Where
water has been privatised, this is usually in the form of long-term concession
contracts. The exception is E&W where privatisation has taken the form of
divestiture. Here, the financial sector has taken root and many of the above-
mentioned features of financialisation are evident. The different forms of providing
water found across the case studies have implications for the way in which
financialisation has emerged in varying forms in the sector.
Each of the many features of financialisation can be demonstrated empirically and
theoretically from a variety of points of view. This is even so, despite some temporary
and mild setbacks from the global crisis, of those of a neo-liberal bent who can offer
explanations in terms of responses to random shocks in otherwise perfectly working
markets (for the Chicago school of thought), or as a result of the uncertainties that
inevitably accompany innovation and change (or too much state interference in this,
for neo-Austrians). What is more at stake is how theory and empirical evidence is
ordered within and across the various factors involved, something that is our
purpose to take up later in some detail in the context of case studies around housing
and water.
Yet one, possibly unsurprising, feature of the financialisation literature is the extent
to which it is not explicitly theoretically innovative in addressing its object of study.
One reason for this is that the literature has been sandwiched, if not squeezed,
between the unavoidable weight of newly emerging and discovered empirical
developments (however well identified, understood and incorporated) and the
application and promotion of prior methodological, conceptual and theoretical
stances. This does, however, allow the theory of financialisation to range from post-
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Keynesianism to performativity and beyond. So, it is not so much that theories of
finance are absent as that they remain at most and at best implicit and, generally,
unquestioned despite their presumed suitability for new or newly-recognised
empirical developments.
It is striking, for example, that financialisation does not appear within mainstream
economics at all. This is to be expected given how it has treated money and finance
in the most recent past, with the former primarily seen as belonging to
macroeconomics and subject to state control over its supply, and the latter confined
to microeconomics and the more or less efficient mobilisation and allocation of
resources. In practice, this has involved an absence of systemic and dynamic
determinants in their historical and social context that are essential factors in
specifying financialisation. In other words, necessarily hypothetically, if mainstream
economics had been genuinely drawn into seeking to conceptualise financialisation,
it might reasonably be expected to have found its theoretical foundations in both
microeconomics and macroeconomics to be seriously unfit for purpose (as, of
course, might also be argued for its application to the pre-financialisation period).8
Whether in its efficient market hypothesis form, or what might be termed its
inefficient market hypothesis form, mainstream approaches to finance have been
seriously deficient in understanding its systemic effects. This is not accidental but a
direct consequence of its undue reliance upon what has been termed its technical
apparatus and technical architecture.9
At the other extreme, most of the other social sciences are familiar and comfortable
with dealing with the systemic and the dynamic so that it is far less irksome for
them, including political economy, to engage with financialisation. As a result, as
seen, analyses of financialisation have blossomed across the social sciences
(outside of economics) displaying a variety of conceptualisation, methods and
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applications with a corresponding collective lack of coherences and self-
examinations.
Not surprisingly, then, Erturk et al (eds) (2008) are able to identify a number of
different approaches to financialisation, including their own synthesis that focuses
upon the contemporary period as one of what they call “coupon pool” capitalism.10
Their synthesis is explicitly made up out of a triangulation of four framings, each
deriving from different intellectual traditions and different time periods in terms of
origins and influence. These are, in their somewhat obscure terms, 1930s liberal
collectivism, 1980s agency theory, the political economy of quantities (that is more
longstanding across heterodox and Marxist schools of economics) and cultural
political economy which, in its application to finance, primarily belongs to the new
millennium. They are surely correct both to suggest that these framings are
mutually incompatible and that each has something to offer. More questionable,
though, is the assertion that these insights cannot be incorporated into a single
frame, if taking each as critical point of departure, something that they seem to
dismiss on the grounds of the fluid nature of finance itself, and the equally fluid and
variable nature of its causes and consequences – financialisation as a veritable
“bricolage” as their favoured descriptive term to accommodate varieties of
determinants and their interactions.11
What would appear to be at issue is whether financialisation can be grounded in a
multi-purpose, if more abstract, theory that could serve to engender coherence,
underpinnings and/or clarity in the forward march of “financialisation” within
scholarship . Inevitably, this will appear to prove impossible if relying upon general
methodological stances (around the systemic and dynamic – financialisation as
culture or as agency for example), at one extreme, and the immediately empirical, at
the other. For the latter, paying a water bill or taking out a mortgage have a greater
or lesser attachment to financialisation without necessarily being, as it were,
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financialisation itself. To tease out the relations involved, it is seems imperative then
to locate financialisation in relation to both the monetary system as a whole, of which
it is but a part, and the non-monetary relations with which financialisation either
directly or indirectly interacts.
Theories of money and finance, as illustrated most obviously by the financialisation
literature itself, necessarily range over a huge landscape from accounts of the forms
and meanings of money, through the macroeconomics of the money supply, to the
more general interaction between putatively separate but intertwined monetary and
real economies in generating employment, investment, inflation, crises and much
else besides. And this is even before the global nature of money has been considered
at one extreme, and everyday life (of the household) at the other. These are all
crucial to a greater or lesser extent for how money and its effects are experienced
and understood and so also for the material culture of financialisation. And, in
particular, simple cultures involving money, in purchasing for consumption,
deploying a credit card, avoiding or negotiating indebtedness, have deep, and
possibly elusive and distant, connections to a financial, and productive, system that
heavily influences in practice how financialisation engenders meanings for those
who are often unaware of how and how deeply they are embroiled within it. A
complete survey of theories of finance and theories of money is beyond the scope of
this paper.12 Instead our focus (in the next section) is limited to money as it relates
to commodities and commodification.
3. From Money through Commodification and beyond (CCFCC …)13
In short, and ideally, analysing financialisation involves three components: a theory
of money, its extension to finance, and specification of the processes attaching
finance to the non-financial, with a corresponding account of the causes and
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consequences of the related outcomes. In this light, some elementary points are
worthy of observation. For, whilst elementary, they provide the basis for addressing
the complexity and diversity of the forms taken by, and impacts of, financialisation
and how it is conceived. First is that money never exists in isolation but involves a
close association with commodities. Equally, the domain of money is delimited, at
least in part, by the domain of commodities although their common domain is far
from fixed across time, place and character – all money-commodity relations are not
the same, even if they share common elements by virtue of being depositories of
exchangeable value despite the diversity of commodities themselves. The shifting
domain of money is acknowledged in the notion of commodification (or, indeed,
decommodification and recommodification) whereby what was previously outside the
domain (for example, water) is incorporated within it (or excluded or reincorporated,
respectively). As is already apparent, then, insofar as finance takes
monetary/commodity relations as its starting point, so financialisation is readily
associated with commodification. 14 This is most obvious, for example, in the
commercialisation and privatisation of state provision which opens up opportunities
for the intervention of finance and financialisation in varieties of ways.
In its universally recognised roles as means of payment and unit of account, money
is embroiled in a sphere or, more exactly, spheres of application that incorporate a
wide range of economic and social activities. Most obviously, of course, is within the
world of markets where commodities are bought and sold through the medium of
money. This involves all sorts of credit relations to which financialisation can attach
itself, as well as currency trading and state finance. But, in addition, in part if not
primarily because of these roles, monetisation is embroiled in interactions beyond
market exchange as with the payment of bribes, taxes, interfamilial transfers and so
on.
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Commodification is widely used to denote the process of moving goods or services
into monetised spheres of existence but there are different elements to this process
and each has significance for the nature and impact of financialisation. Here we can
distinguish between commodification of production as such (reduced on a narrow
definition to the production of commodities for the purpose of profitability) and the
adoption of the commodity form (without commodification) where “payments” of a
more or less casual and periodic nature are made for whatever reason. More or less
nominal user charges for a state-owned health service certainly involve the
commodity form but not commodities as such. And arrangements of this type vary by
degree of penetration of the commodity form, their influence (is payment token or
not) and, equally important, their dynamic. While the commodity form may not be for
profitable purposes this might, for example, be transitional to further
commercialisation and privatisation (and even intended as such) or be a means of
financially sustaining state provision against or simply in absence of privatisation,
with the state potentially subsidising provision over partially covered costs. So
commodity form, cf, can occur without commodification, c, but there cannot in
general be c without cf (but see below on the peculiar commodity form taken by
commodified water).
Further, the realm of monetisation/commodification extends beyond the activities
attached to commodities and commodity forms themselves to their application in
calculation or even qualitative reasoning in which neither commodities nor money
are themselves necessarily present, i.e. for which money does not actually exchange
hands, even as a matter of settling of accounts.15 Money enters our consciousness
even where it does not enter our practices. This tends to move to quantification –
how much is something worth in monetary terms - but it can remain at the abstract
level of whether we can evaluate something in such terms in principle irrespective of
whether it is done in practice. Equally, whether it be virtue or otherwise, we may
eschew such evaluations in placing certain “commodities” beyond the cash nexus as
17
This project has received funding from the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme
for research, technological development and demonstration under grant agreement no 266800
it were.16 In short, the extent and scope of commodification, and commodity forms
and calculation, have long since become sufficiently widespread and ingrained, that
we are enabled to deploy them in the abstract, both individually and collectively,
irrespective of whether money and “commodity” are actually exchanged (or other
activity occurs for monetary reward). Such is the nature of cost-benefit analysis in
theory and practice, as well as decisions in our daily lives as we choose to save
money or not by self-provisioning rather than purchasing – I saved (how much, an
unknowable amount) by walking rather than catching a bus or going by car. Cc can
take place without cf or c. Whilst, cf can be a token payment or can be based on a
more detailed cc, c generally requires both cc and cf (although these can take on
peculiar characteristics in case of water, for example, as unit prices do not always
prevail).
Significantly, the troika of commodification, commodity form and commodity
calculation (ccfcc) has given rise to a debate over the nature of money itself which is
worth rehearsing for it concerns how money and, hence, its derivative,
financialisation, is to be understood systemically and, accordingly, enters into our
daily lives. For Zelizer (1994, 1996, 1998 and 2000), 17 drawing upon different
examples of the uses of money and the motivations for them, there can be no
general, or universal, theory of money since it (even one currency note as opposed to
another) carries different meanings contingent upon its origins (how it is obtained)
and its destinations (how it is spent).18 As a result, each acquisition and/or use of
money is potentially differentiated from others according to the motives, actions,
indeed the cultures, of those who engage with it, whether it be the differences
between how men and women engage in monetary relations, for example, or the
rationalities associated with gambling or luxury display as opposed saving for a rainy
day.
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By contrast, Fine and Lapavitsas (2000), Fine (2002) and Lapavitsas (2003), whilst
recognising the presence of such multiple monies as they are termed, suggest that
this needs to be rooted in a universal theory of money (and equivalents). Indeed, it
precisely because money is (almost literally) a blank sheet of paper (apart from
numerical denominations) that it is able to perform its diverse roles as multiple
monies and incorporate mixes of practices and motivations (across ccfcc). As French
et al (2011, p. 809) observe, however accurately, referencing Zelizer for support:
Even accounts of financialization that have sought to think about money more as a
mutable network still implicitly cleave to an understanding of money as necessarily
disembedding and alienating, an agent that acts on social relations, rather than
being constituted by social relations.
Admittedly, for example, banks and other financial agents have provided an increase
in mortgage-lending due to a growing culture of homeownership. The growth of this
culture has in turn affected the practices, even the creation, of financial agents (sub-
prime traders) but the culture itself could not have emerged without the lending
practices. An expression of a preference for home ownership as the tenure of choice
is only possible because of the availability of mortgage finance. Accordingly, social
relations both shape and are shaped by interactions with finance. But that those
engaging in monetary relations both act upon (make finance available for whatever,
for example) and are constituted by (take savings from whomsoever) social relations
(and, indeed, constitute them, the worlds of financial elites or payday loans for
example) is as much an argument for, as against, a universal theory of money.19
For although money takes on a range of forms and provides a range of functions,
reflecting the diverse social relations in which it is embedded, the multiple roles
played by money are structured in part by common systemic factors, which, through
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interaction with financial agents, have efficacy in shaping monetary relations. To give
an example, taking out a mortgage does not make the culture of owner-occupation
what it is, nor is owner-occupation, as an integral part of the housing system,
possible in the absence of mortgages. And, by the same token, paying a water bill
does not lead to the culture of derivative trading by providers but remains essential
to it. However, that these are both entirely distinct applications of money and
finance, with determinants that are not self-contained, does not mean they are
disconnected from one another and do not have common systemic influences,
appropriately addressed through an underlying, universal theory of multiple monies,
as it were.
In other words, it is the homogenising nature of money that allows it to be so diverse
in application in both practice and thought (and calculation and, as it were, knowing
the price of everything and the value of nothing).20 By the same token, however, such
a universal approach to the nature of money carries the implication that it is
otherwise silent, even ignorant, around the origins and nature of the ccfccs to which
it is attached in practice and/or thought. Just give me the money (or assess
monetary value) in exchange (possibly in thought alone) for whatever is at hand, it
might be said. With the commodity, for example, the duality between use value and
exchange value is one that is not simply comprised of useful properties and their
evaluation exclusively at the point of sale. For use value, the physically and socially
determined nature of the commodity will depend upon how it has been produced,
distributed and sold as well as how it is subsequently used for further economic
activity and/or consumption. Further, in case of cf and cc, these too have social
origins with continuing effects although they are not necessarily (exclusively or
primarily) rooted in the imperatives of the market mechanism (bribery is not
[re]produced as a commodity nor is the payment of taxes and pocket money,
although “market forces” may exert an influence).
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It might seem that the distinction between a theory of many monies and one of
universal money with contingent and diverse outcomes is merely academic.
However, it is at least symbolic of much deeper issues that go the heart of
methodological differences. The multiple monies approach is mindful both of
avoiding undue (economic) determinism, whether derived from homo economicus or
some form of structuralism, and of allowing for individual cultures and subjectivities.
By contrast, the universal approach tends to be committed to systemic analysis and
to emphasise how such individual subjectivities are constrained by both the nature of
money and the social structures to which it is attached. A resolution of these
differences is important not so much for the theory of money as such (and its various
uses in day-to-day expenditure as is the preferred territory of the multiple monies
approach) as for how such a theory underpins the more general and developed
theory of finance in which money (as capital) is embroiled in unavoidable systemic
effects, not least through financialisation as will be addressed in what follows. The
virtue of the universal approach is that it attends to both systemic and specific roles
of money as well as the pathways through which financialisation has both direct and
indirect effects. And, for the indirect effects, “finance” as such can be directly
involved but not financialisation itself (the taking out of a mortgage or the paying of a
water bill, for example) or it can even be detached from exchange relations as in the
exercise of power or influence . This is, however, contingent on how financialisation
is defined (as it is always involved if its definition is taken wide enough to incorporate
the presence of money and/or monied interests).
In this light, observe that, although the nature of the commodity remains
controversial within Marxist value theory (where it probably attracts the closest and
most detailed attention in contrast to a more general tendency to depend upon a
simple market/non-market dualism), it is imperative to draw the logical distinctions
between commodities, commodity form and commodity calculation. Each also has
different implications for financialisation. In reverse order, commodity calculation
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can at most facilitate financialisation as it does not itself involve monetary flows as
such. Commodity form can be the basis for financialisation insofar as regular flows
of money, not necessarily involving commodity production, are securitised, thereby
creating an asset that can be traded.21 Only with commodities, and their integration
into the circuits of production and exchange, is the potential for financialisation fully
released, allowing for whatever both cf and cc have to offer, as well as the range of
financial processes underpinning production and sale.
It also follows that these distinctions bear upon the processes as well as the
presence of financialisation by which is meant at least the increasing weight of
finance in economic and social life. For, the process of commodification itself (and so
shifts from cc to cf and from cf to c) strengthens the potential for financialisation. In
a slightly more refined way, this says little more than that expanding the realm of the
market underpins the potential realm of financialisation. But it follows that
financialisation is attached to a wide range of economic and social processes that
are subject both to varying degrees of, and potential for, financialisation as they are
themselves reproduced and/or transformed (for example, through
commercialisation or privatisation).
So financialisation feeds on money (in ways as yet to be more fully specified), and
money feeds on commodities and vice-versa, allowing for the more generalised
formation of commodity forms and calculation. Such are the consequences of a
universal theory of money, which allows for differentiation across the different
processes to which it is attached, with a corresponding obligation to investigate the
substance of the economic and social relations, structures, processes and agencies
to which it is attached.22 Wherever activities fall across the ccfcc divides, their
monetary forms of expression are this and no more, innocent of why and how they
belong where they do. This does not mean that money is a passive reflection of the
activities to which it is attached, something that is forcibly realised in crises, but nor
22
This project has received funding from the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme
for research, technological development and demonstration under grant agreement no 266800
does it have a uniform let alone an independent existence from the highly varied
worlds of ccfcc.
That financialisation is associated with the encroachment of monetary relations is
evidenced in the case studies, which document a marked increase in the presence
and influence of market forces in the provision of housing and water across the
countries considered. Yet the case studies also show that simply to equate
financialisation with commodification would be misleading. The provision of housing
and water is highly variegated across the countries considered, and this variegation
is underpinned by a range of market forms. We suggest that the ccfcc triad can help
to explicate this variegation by unpicking the diversity of arrangements concealed
under the spread of a more amorphous notion of market forces.
The most striking feature of housing provision in the era of financialisation has been
the rise of owner-occupation as the favoured tenure form (that is, the favoured set of
arrangements for accessing housing). 23 Owner-occupation involves households
purchasing and inhabiting their own dwelling, in contrast with the most common
alternative tenures, private and social rental, whereby households rent their
dwelling from a private or social landlord, respectively, with the latter usually
involving some sort of rental subsidy. One of the merits of the SoP approach is that it
looks beyond the allocation arrangements that are typically the focus of neoclassical
economics, opening up the black boxes of production and consumption in order to
investigate the entire chain of provision. In this context, the degree of
commodification of owner-occupation becomes a question, not simply of whether
houses are bought and sold in a market, but also of the nature of the rules governing
land use and the character of housing producers. While owner-occupation can be
fully commodified - if land is accessed through the market and the homes concerned
are built and sold for profit - it is notable that it is not necessarily so. At the other
extreme to production and sale for profit, it is possible for owner-occupied homes to
23
This project has received funding from the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme
for research, technological development and demonstration under grant agreement no 266800
be built and allocated without the profit motive playing a role at all – if, for example,
the state were to requisition land, build housing and transfer ownership to
inhabitants administratively.
In practice, owner-occupation in the case study countries has exhibited varying
degrees and types of commodification along the chain of provision. Before
discussing them in more detail, it should be noted that all of the case study countries
had a significant commodified owner-occupation sector that preceded the period
looked at in the case studies, with the exception of Poland, where housing was
decommodified under socialism. We therefore follow the case studies in focusing on
areas of transition in the housing sector.
Beginning with consumption, in Portugal owner-occupation expanded at the expense
of the private rented sector and informal shanty towns in response to increased
availability of mortgages. Housing provision therefore underwent a shift from one
form of commodified relations (rental) to another (purchase), with the aid of
mortgage subsidies and state investment in infrastructure. In the UK and Poland,
commodification of housing was given a big push by the privatisation of social
housing from the 1980s and 1990s, respectively. However, the character of this shift
is complex. On the one hand, prior to privatisation, social housing was characterised
by the commodity form, in that occupants paid monthly rents to state providers,
albeit at subsidised rates. On the other hand, the sale of this housing did not in itself
transform that housing into commodities because the profit motive played no role.
The privatised housing had been built by the state and was sold at a heavy discount
to sitting tenants, hence, is better understood as an alternative commodity form. The
push given to commodification of housing by privatisation came from the way in
which ownership of state-built housing facilitated entry into private housing markets.
In the UK, this has been fully realised as there have been high rates of sale of
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privatised housing, allowing agents to enter secondary housing markets. In Poland
this process has been impeded by the poor quality of the privatised housing stock.
The South African government has sought to spread homeownership to the poor
black population by subsidising investment in basic housing units, which are
allocated through an application process among those meeting income
requirements. Access to housing for this section of the population relies on the
commodity form only in so far as a small payment is involved in the bureaucratic
process through which basic housing units are allocated. As in the UK and Poland, it
was hoped that giving poorer households ownership rights over subsidised
properties would facilitate entry of those households – and the subsidised properties
- into the secondary housing market. However, the generally poor quality of the
subsidised housing has prevented this from happening. The Turkish case study,
which focuses on Istanbul, describes the way in with the Mass Housing
Administration (TOKI) has collaborated with private developers to displace squatting
communities and free up land for the development of middle- and upper-income
housing. This process has seen one set of commodified relations (within squatting
communities) replacing another (middle- and upper-class flats). The lower-income
residents displaced in the process have been rehoused in state-provided housing, for
which they pay the state under arrangements captured by the commodity form.
Turning to production, irrespective of the range of acquisition arrangements,
commodified relations dominated housing production in all case studies, with
housebuilding carried out by capitalist agents for profit. This is the case even for
production that is state-led, as for low-income housing in Turkey and South Africa.
Here, investment comes from the state but private firms are contracted to carry out
construction. The same is true of the small amount of state-subsidised housing that
exists in the UK, Portugal and Poland. The only exceptions are those parts of the
housing stock that were built by producers directly employed by the state and then
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privatised, in the UK and Poland, and self-build, which accounts for a significant part
of supply in both Poland and Portugal. While self-build is decommodified, in the
sense that households build for their own use rather than for profit, it is nonetheless
embedded in a series of commodified relationships effecting land acquisition,
materials and, in many cases, the employment of a contract builder to manage
delivery.
Land is a central component of housing production, and arrangements governing
access and use shape housing systems in important ways. Though not strictly a
commodity, because not produced, land can be commodified in the sense that
access is determined through private property rights exchanged on a market. A
trend reported across the case studies was that land use is increasingly governed by
the logic of the market or ‘best (monetary) value’ use. However, within this trend,
commodification across the case studies once again took varying forms. In Portugal,
land is largely commodified, subject to land use regulations administered by the
state. The case study documents, in addition, the incorporation of slum-cleared
areas into formal land markets. In the UK, land is similarly largely commodified, and
planning authorities’ decisions over land use have become increasingly determined
by monetary value, leading to the squeezing of social housing in desirable areas and
growing investment in real estate assets. An unwillingness to intervene in land
markets has also shaped the housing SoP in South Africa. In particular, it has
confined subsidised low-income housing to areas remote from employment centres
and lacking infrastructure. A similar relegation of the poor to low value land was
evident in Turkey, though there we have seen a more active process of removal, with
lower income communities compulsory relocated, often offering violent resistance.
Land was rapidly commodified following Poland’s transition from socialism, under
which land was allocated administratively. Poland’s “shock therapy” put in place lax
land use regulations, giving rise to chaotic patterns of development.
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It is clear from this discussion that the promotion of owner-occupation in the era of
financialisation cannot be reduced to commodification per se. Housing provision
occurs through a series of arrangements embodying varying forms and degrees of
commodification. This is compounded by the observation that owner-occupation is
not the only way of commodifying housing provision. Private rental is also a
commodified form of housing provision, especially if both the production and the
rental of housing are carried out for the purpose of profit-making. What
distinguishes owner-occupation – and makes it the quintessential form of
financialised housing provision – is that the cost of housing relative to incomes
entails that house purchase is dependent on credit for most households. Owner-
occupation thus serves to incorporate households into financial markets, expanding
the scope for financial profit, through both interest on mortgage payments and
trading rights to those payments on secondary mortgage markets.
Indirectly, owner-occupation has also been associated with the spread of commodity
calculation by reconstituting individuals as neoliberal agents. The idea here is that,
by providing individuals with an asset that can be borrowed against and used to
accumulate wealth through capital gains and climbing the housing ladder, owner-
occupation serves to inculcate rational economic behaviour in individuals, expanding
the scope of commodity calculation in to more areas of daily life, Payne (2012). In the
extreme, owner-occupation has been seen as the lynchpin of an ‘asset-based
welfare system’, in which widespread homeownership “serves as a tool or lever for
governments to institute welfare reform” thus allowing “governments to pursue
restructuring programmes that downsize other welfare services, notably social care
and pensions, or allocate them to a local level” Van Gent (2010, p. 376).
To sum up, the financialisation of housing has fed off the extension of the scope of
monetary relations within housing provision, with the particular form of debt-based
form of monetary relations associated with owner-occupation being most prominent.
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Yet beneath this general trend lies a wide variety of forms of commodification and
methods through which they have been extended, giving rise to variegated forms of
financialisation across the housing systems considered.
Before we move on to water, this discussion of owner-occupation and the ways in
which it provides a vehicle for financialisation requires some caveats. First, while the
promotion of owner-occupation and incorporation of households into mortgage
markets has been a clear goal of governments, it has not always been achieved and,
when it has, has often proved dysfunctional. As mentioned, despite hopes that state
subsidies would provide a launching pad for poor black households to climb up the
housing ladder, South Africa’s low income housing market remains segregated from
the secondary housing market, and low income households largely excluded from
mortgage markets. Even in the UK and Portugal, countries in which owner-
occupation is widespread and mortgage markets mature, a recent revival of the
private rented sector suggests that the owner-occupation tenure form is reaching its
limits.
Second, the tying of owner-occupation to the encroachment of commodity
calculation on individual rationality is arguably more a facet of scholarship and policy
than it is reality. The idea appears in academic literature more often as an analysis
of the rationale governing policy than of the extent to which that policy agenda has
been successful (see, for example, Payne (2012), Van Gent (2010), Crouch (2009),
Finlayson (2009), and Watson (2009). Where the latter question has been asked it has
been met with scepticism. For example, Touissant and Elsinger (2009) distinguish
between ‘old’ and ‘new’ asset-based welfare systems. In the former, associated with
Southern Europe, housing plays a role in supporting welfare provision as a result of
its being embedded in familial support structures. Only in the latter – associated
with Anglo-American countries – is housing asset-based welfare linked to
financialisation and commodity calculation. Even here, we should be wary of
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assuming that individuals are passively reformed in response to shifting forms of
provision, as the imperative to treat housing as an asset runs into other meanings
and uses that people attach to housing, most notably as a place of comfort, security
and shelter, Robertson (2014a). What these caveats tell us is that variegation is not
only a product of the different means through which commodification has been
extended in different social and economic contexts, but also of the dysfunctions,
contradictions, and resistances to which commodification gives rise.
The provision of water has also undergone something of a transformation since the
1980s in each of the case studies. As with housing, the case studies show varying
forms and degrees of commodification. For most of the last century water was
provided as a strategic resource to support what Bakker (2005) terms a “state
hydraulic” paradigm of water management characterised by centrally planned
investments to provide for economic growth and social development. The high
capital costs and long infrastructure lifetimes meant that public financing was
crucial for the development of water supply across the world. Water was provided by
the state with a focus on supply-side interventions following the cholera and typhoid
epidemics of the cities in the nineteenth century. These aspects of water – the high
cost and long-term nature of investment, combined with the public health elements
of provision – meant that the system of water provision did not appear to easily lend
itself to commodification.
Changes in the sector came in the 1980s with the rise of neoliberalism (see other
thematic papers for this Deliverable, D.8.27) and increasing attention to state failure
and environmental concerns. Water consumption had begun to tail off in many
countries. In E&W the system of centralised water planning failed to anticipate a
dramatic decline in industrial water demand as the country’s economic structure
shifted from manufacturing to services. Ten regional water authorities were created
in E&W in the 1970s. Their operations were financially ring-fenced from the local
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authority and they were obliged to operate on a cost recovery basis. From the early
1980s they were able to borrow from private capital. The same pattern can be
observed to varying degrees across all of the case studies, although this
transformation came a decade or so later outside E&W, with corporatisation of water
companies becoming core sector policy. Cost recovery pricing was introduced
across all locations, although still in E&W the majority of households are charged on
the basis of the rateable value of their property rather than their water consumption.
In most other countries water consumption is now metered.
England and Wales were among the first in the world to introduce water
privatisation. This took the form of listing the water companies on the London Stock
Exchange (LSE) in 1989. The perception at this stage was that private financing could
be substituted for public borrowing in a benign swap that had the advantage of
appearing to reduce public borrowing. Elsewhere privatisation was introduced in
different ways. In South Africa, water remains the responsibility of the municipality
but private investors have been sought to undertake management contracts (eg in
Johannesburg) or long-term concession contracts with municipalities. These were
introduced in the late 1990s and just two remain. In Portugal also municipalities
could enter into private concession contracts from 1993. These are skewed to the
more wealthy areas with just 29 private concessions for retail water out of 380
managing entities. However, these cover 13% of the population. In Poland the sector
was restructured in the early 1990s with water providers established at arm’s length
from the municipality with diverse ownership structures. Water was privatised in
Gdansk in 1993. This then brought the production of water into the realm of
commodity production but still a strong role for the state remained, often as provider
and even with privatised water, the state continues to govern pricing and production
standards. The process of commodification of water has generally stopped short of
water trading24 (except in a few locations, Grafton et al 2010).
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There are ways in which the case of E&W differs from the other case studies and
these have shaped the processes of commodification and financialisation. First, in
this case the transition is permanent. Listing the water companies on the LSE sent a
clear signal of commitment to commodification in perpetuity. For firms and
financiers, this provides a more secure framework for long-term financing decisions
than fixed term contracts. Second, water companies are regulated by the central
economic regulator, Ofwat, which sets policy and answers to the central
government. This is in contrast to the other concessions which are answerable to
local municipalities. In Portugal there is a sector regulator, ERSAR, but it was only in
2014 that ERSAR took over water pricing from the municipalities. Third, this is a
national programme where all water and sewerage companies were privatised
(albeit at considerable discount to ensure interest from investors) and not just water
but also energy, telecoms and the rail network were all privatised around the same
time. In this country, then, privatisation was part of a national shift towards
commodification of infrastructure. In contrast, privatisation accounts for only a small
element of provision in the other case study countries. The result is that the
transition is deeper and more far-reaching and attached to a bigger political project
than privatisation in the other countries.
The case of E&W has also seen some changes over time as privatisation has
matured. From the mid-1990s, firms were targets for takeovers with their large cash
balances, low levels of debts and high and secure revenues. Initially the incomers
were European and American infrastructure companies. Now, out of ten water and
sewerage companies that were listed on the LSE in 1989, three remain listed, two
have been delisted and are owned by Asian conglomerates, one is a not-for-profit
company and four are owned by financial sector companies. In the other case
studies, Portugal has had the most privatisation. Here too there has been some
consolidation as the global and domestic environment has changed. The initial
investors were local Portuguese and Spanish construction companies. More
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recently, the last couple of years have seen the entry of Asian investors in the sector
with Japanese conglomerate, Marubeni, taking over AGS in 2014 and Beijing
Enterprises Water Group buying a group of water companies from Veolia in 2013.25 In
South Africa, many initial attempts at privatisation were short-lived and only two
long-term contracts remain. Both of these have been consolidated and since 2012
have been owned by the Singapore-based company, Sembcorp (which is also the
owner of an English water-only company in Bournemouth).
The process of privatisation connects water consumers with circuits of global
financial capital, of which they are largely unaware. The two largest investors in
water privatisation contracts over the past ten years, Veolia Environnement and
Suez, have been operating in each of the case study countries at various times since
the early 1990s. These companies are linked to financial markets far removed from
water consumption, via financial intermediaries, for example, with water-targeted
investment funds which are traded on the New York Stock Exchange. Owners of
shares in some of these financial products, such as Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs),
include investment funds operating on behalf of high net worth individuals. In this
way, stakes in water infrastructure have become an asset class and households are
connected with the world’s richest individuals via finance (see Bayliss (2013) for
more on this). In addition, some of these water-related financial products also
include stakes in some of the LSE-listed English water companies, Severn Trent,
Pennon and United Utilities. So a water consumer in the south-west of England
paying their water bill contributes to the same pool of funds as the bill payment from
a customer of Veolia in South Africa or Portugal (at least, until recently as Veolia
sold its stakes in each of these in 2012 and 2013, respectively) which trickles up to
the high net worths at the top of the financial food chain. Eventually returns from
ETFs are paid out, via asset fund managers, to the world’s richest as well as to
pension funds (although only the identity of five largest stakeholders are disclosed
so the ultimate beneficiaries from these company dividends are unknown).
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Since the emergence of Asian investors on the scene, there has been further
consolidation with finance in other parts of the world. For example, Sembcorp from
Singapore which now owns the two South African water companies as well as
Bournemouth Water, in England, is owned by the Government of Singapore (with
49.5%) and the balance of shares is listed on the Singapore Stock Exchange. As with
E&W, financialisation processes have connected water consumers in English and
South African towns to investors on the Singapore exchange.
Commodification via privatisation therefore unwittingly connects some households
to the world’s financial capitals through their consumption of water. However, the
range is limited in the case study countries as privatisation was not widespread and
was usually only implemented in the more affluent and profitable locations. There is
a growing divide, with water consumers in the same country paying into global
financial chains while others pay to the local municipality. Some are more directly
part of financialisation processes than other.
4. … And Financialisation …
Having outlined the analytical categories captured by ccfcc and discussed them in
relation to housing and water, it remains to tie these categories to financialisation
and contemporary capitalism more generally. We do this by considering another
commonly observed function of money – that of store of value (however economic
“value” might be understood and determined). This function of money attains greater
significance in the era of financialisation due to the proliferation of asset trading.
Indeed, the role of money as store of value has underpinned the new forms and
scales of profit-making that have emerged through the financial system over the last
few decades. As we show in this section, the nature of these new forms and scales,
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and how they have played out in relation to both economic and social reproduction,
can in turn be understood in part by drawing the distinction between capital
extended in circulation for consumption and that extended for production.
As store of value, money, or the idea of monetary value, is represented symbolically
as an asset. This symbolic representation can circulate independently of the
purported value that it represents, as is the case with trade credit or a generalised
system of IOUs. What these share in common is both a redistribution of payment and
receipt of monetary values over time together with a redistribution of the values
concerned (with later payment usually commanding greater value depending on
interest effectively charged and in the absence of default). To give a housing-related
example, claims to mortgage repayments, secured on the values of the houses to
which those mortgages are attached, are traded as assets on financial markets in
the form of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBSs). In addition, the value of
these RMBSs may fluctuate in response to supply and demand for such securities on
financial markets, even if the value of the asset underpinning the security – directly,
mortgages, indirectly, house prices – does not change. Certainly, in principle, the
different values involved, and the relationship between them, can diverge as is
sharply revealed in bubbles and crashes.
Accordingly, paper claims on (expanded) value were termed fictitious (capital) by
Marx, not because the value on which they depend does not exist (other than by way
of exception), but precisely because the paper claims involved can take on a value
distinct from whatever value-generating process (or not) that is supposedly
underpinning them (just as paper money is more or less worthless relative to the
value it represents, only that represented value is intended to expand for fictitious
capital).
34
This project has received funding from the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme
for research, technological development and demonstration under grant agreement no 266800
In other words, the fictitious nature of the paper does not make it capital as such.
For this, the paper claim is contingent upon value that has yet to be produced and
realised, or is in process. For Marx, and equally for Minsky if on a different basis
drawing on the accounting and borrowing practices of firms, the distinction between
monetary relations based on credit as such and those contingent upon continuing
expansion (production and realisation of surplus value for Marx, and hedge,
speculative and Ponzi borrowing for Minsky) is crucial.26 In particular, for Marx,
underpinning this distinction is a separation between different types of capital
operating within exchange, namely, that facilitating consumption and that facilitating
production. For the former, most readily associated with buying and selling
commodities, especially on credit, as a function of commodity circulation, such
capitals tend to earn a normal rate of profit similar to industrial capital. For the
latter, capital in exchange, providing for the expansion of production by mobilising
financial resources for that purpose, is not necessarily subject to the same form of
competition and attracts interest, and a deduction from surplus generated, before it
is distributed to other capitals.
Consider, for example, a bank that borrows (takes deposits) and lends without the
need to use any capital of its own. Whatever return it makes by differences between
rates of interest for borrowing and lending (and to cover expenses) will yield an
infinite rate of profit. This could, of course, be reduced by competitive presence or
entry of others into the sector but if there is, indeed, some minimum scale of capital
required to enter and compete (let alone state regulation), then incumbents are not
likely to make such capital available to potential rivals at their own expense. This is
not to say that banks (or financial institutions more generally) can charge whatever
they like for (some of) their services, only that the competitive process for them is
different than for other capitals (since it does not tend to provide the financial means
to compete with itself, only for competition in other sectors).
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In addition, it cannot be predetermined, even if intentions are solid, whether financial
services individually designed to promote a return by expanding provision do achieve
this return in practice especially for the economy as a whole. An enterprise may fail
and, vice-versa, a simple credit or transfer to fund consumption (pensions, for
example, spent on food) may promote profitable provision (for food enterprises) for
what would otherwise be an unsuccessful loan for the capitalist providing for that
consumption. In short, the extent to which expansion of financial services coincides
with expansion of material provision, whether as output or profitability, is of
necessity highly variable as is sharply revealed in case of sectoral or economy-wide
bubbles and collapses.
This last point is illustrated by both housing and water. For housing, the distinction
between monetary relations based on credit and those dependent on continuing
expansion corresponds to that between mortgage lending for house purchase and
lending to housing developers. Across the case studies, financialisation is associated
with expanded mortgage lending, notwithstanding variation in the size and cover of
mortgage markets in the countries considered. There has thus been a
reorganisation of housing provision that has served to expand finance’s claim on
incomes. In some cases – predominantly the USA and Britain, and to a lesser extent
elsewhere - secondary mortgage markets have emerged on which these claims have
been traded. Increased mortgage lending has served to expand financial sector
profits, which, as mentioned above, arise from fluctuations in the value of RMBSs
away from the value of the income stream underpinning the asset, as well as from
the value of that income stream itself. Expanded mortgage lending has also tended
to drive up house prices, but whether or not this is translated into expanded material
provision is dependent on patterns of development finance as well as the way in
which the housebuilding industry operates.
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In general, the expansion of finance for production has been more limited than that
of house purchase finance. Among the case study countries, only Portugal saw a
significant increase in lending for house building. There, the construction and real
estate sectors increased their share in total business lending from 10% in 1992 to
40% in 2008, and this created a housebuilding boom corresponding to the house
price boom. Both Turkey and South Africa also experienced a boom in building, but
this relied on the state providing land and investment finance, respectively. In the
UK, by contrast, constraints on supply have been two-fold. First, mortgage lending
expanded at a much faster rate than lending for development, meaning that finance
inflated demand more than supply. Second, the structure of the housebuilding
industry in Britain – most notably, the dominance of speculative housebuilders and a
restrictive planning system – has channelled a large portion of the development
finance that is available into land, hindering production volumes and inflating
speculative land and house price bubbles prone to collapse when finance is
withdrawn.
In water financialisation has deepened in E&W with the arrival of a new type of
investor in the water sector in the 2000s. Initial takeovers by American and European
investors were sold out to Asian and private equity owners of water companies. The
case study research indicates that the type of owner had an impact on the nature and
extent of financialisation practices in the provision of water. Notably, the four water
companies owned by private equity firms in E&W have introduced predatory financial
practices to increase shareholder earnings. Mostly these companies are owned by
special purpose vehicles (SPVs) put together by a group of financial investors, and
their headquarters are registered offshore. The rise of the SPV is increasingly
significant for infrastructure finance and has been widespread in public-private
partnerships (PPPs). The project structure is attractive because there is no recourse
to the assets of the investors, and finance is raised on the strength of the project or
investment itself. The project assets are isolated from the rest of the other assets of
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the SPV shareholders. PPPs that are financed in this way tend to be highly-
leveraged. Investors in these water SPVs are asset managers, investment banks,
pension funds and similar financial entities, and they receive the residual from the
project or the operations of the water utility.
The water companies owned by SPVs have the most complex and least transparent
of ownership structures. These four companies, Thames, Anglian, Yorkshire and
Southern Water, all have a similar corporate group structure. The regulated water
company is situated in a chain of companies, some of which are based in tax havens.
Funds are transferred up and down the ownership chain in a dense sequence of
dividends and interest payments on inter-group loans. Several holding companies
with similar names in the chain of ownership do nothing apart from receive interest
and/or dividends and then pay these out to other group companies with the SPV as
the ultimate owner. Each of these has a group company in the Cayman Islands. This
is to enable the buyer of the water company to add the debt incurred to buy the water
company to the water company itself (“acquisition debt”), something not allowed by
UK company law. This use of debt to buy the company, where the debt is raised on
the strength of the company being bought, is a kind of leveraged buyout, popular
with private equity firms and described by Investopedia as “an especially ruthless
predatory tactic”.
While such financial practices were not documented in the other case studies, in
Portugal the purchase of the utility, CGEP, when it was acquired by Beijing
Enterprises Water Group (BEWG) Ltd27 from Veolia in 2013,28 was in part financed by
loans from the new shareholders to the water utility. The shareholder loan will be
paid interest annually by CGEP to its parent holding company. So, the utility pays
interest to the owners of the company on funds used to buy the company. Interest,
where it is paid on loans from shareholders, is another form of shareholder
distribution along with dividends. And the interest is tax deductible.29
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In E&W, the SPV-owned water companies have also carried out a complex corporate
restructuring known as “Whole Business Securitisation” (WBS) which has enabled
them to raise the debts of the water company which are secured against the
expected revenue from future bill payments which are securitised. The process of
WBS is only possible in restricted circumstances where firms have a stable and
predictable revenue stream, so a privatised water utility is ideal. One of the
conditions of the water company licence, set by the regulator, is that the water
company has to have a credit rating which is “investment grade”. Increasing debt
levels puts this rating at risk. The WBS process, however, enables a higher level of
debt within the limits of the credit rating.
The WBS process was originally devised to enable a not-for-profit company to take
over Welsh Water using high levels of debt. This financing structure was
subsequently replicated by the private equity-owned companies. Welsh Water now
has one of the lowest levels of gearing and highest credit ratings in the sector while
the private equity owned firms have the highest gearing levels and lowest credit
ratings. This shows that it is not the financial structures or mechanisms as such that
necessarily create financial extraction but the commodity production.
Across the sector, levels of gearing have increased substantially since privatisation.
To some extent, this has fed a significant increase in investment but firms have used
also used these debts to finance shareholder distributions. In common with wider
experiences of financialisation, the sector has seen a large increase in rentier
payments. The yearly charge for net interest payable for the nine England WaSCs
increased from £288m to over £2,000m in the twenty years from 1993 to 2012 (in
2012 prices).30 Where the interest paid is to shareholders on loans to the company,
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sometimes at 18% rate of interest, there are even greater benefits for the owners of
water companies.
The financialisation of the sector is evident in the significant structural
transformation that has taken place since privatisation with the shift in resource
allocation away from wage labour towards rentier provisions (interest and
dividends). Also in keeping with wider patterns, this has been accompanied by a
significant increase in remuneration of directors as reward for meeting shareholder
interests. This permeates the whole sector. The Chief Executive of the regulator
Ofwat, Jonson Cox was awarded £10m when he left his former position as CEO of
Anglian Water in recognition of the substantial increase in the share price that had
occurred under his leadership.
This reflects the wider pattern of financialisation where the enrichment of
shareholders and company managers has been at the expense of workers’ wages
and benefits (Van der Zwan 2014). In water companies, workers have faced
downward pressure on wages and conditions both from dividend-focused
shareholders as well as regulator pressure to improve “productivity”. In E&W there
was some evidence of companies reporting they would need to lay off staff to meet
the conditions set in the regulatory price review.
This financialised outcome is overseen by the state. The sector is regulated
according to a structure of price controls established at the time of privatisation in
1989, but the current nature and practices of the company owners have changed
dramatically since then. Within this regulatory framework, company debt and
dividends are considered to be “market outcomes” and are not subject to any control
(as long as the company retains a credit rating which is “investment grade”). In
response to suggestions that Ofwat should specify a gap on gearing levels or set
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specific liquidity ratios, the regulator sees disadvantages to bringing such measures
into the companies’ licences mainly because Ofwat is no better able to assess what
would be appropriate than the markets themselves or the credit ratings agencies:
“We are unlikely to be in a better position than the credit rating agencies or the
markets themselves to determine appropriate constraints on financial ratios and
capital structure” Ofwat (2011) cited in Bayliss (2014).
In this section, we have sought to take further the theoretical, or framing,
perspectives previously developed in which the notion of “financialisation” as the
eponymous presence of finance is unpicked into various categories around ccfcc, the
presence of fictitious capital or not and the way in which these impinge upon the
SoPs for water and housing across our case studies. It should be added that, as
items of final consumption, both housing and water (which is also a commercial
input) have peculiar characteristics as use values. For water, whilst in principle it
could be charged for by the unit like many other commodities especially with
metering, in practice the pricing to which it is attached tends to be subject to more
complicated forms of charging reflecting infrastructural or other costs and criteria
in more or less arbitrary ways. For example, in E&W households cannot be
disconnected for non-payment. This shapes credit relations in the sector as
households are advised that water is not a priority debt, compared to electricity for
example or even credit card “abuse”. In South Africa some water is provided for free
for some households. Paradoxically, this means to some degree that water is
produced as a commodity but, in some instances, the commodity form to which it is
attached is suspended. After all, getting water for free in these circumstances is not
the same in anyway whatsoever as the free provision of water. It is simply the
exception of the rule for water not being free in some ways as if the water had been
stolen, signifying not the absence of commodity or other relations but breaches with
them. And, more generally, just because water is regulated, this does not mean that
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it is not produced as a commodity but merely, and paradoxically, not in an “ideal”
commodity form.
In other words, even our disaggregation into ccfcc as the basis for addressing the
scope for financialisation cannot tell the full story of provision, not least because
these are fluid categories in practice both in and of themselves and in relation to one
another. What can be discerned, however, is how financialisation is associated with
the pressures to ease and draw upon transitions from cc to cf and from cf to cc in
systems of provision, although such processes are influenced both by the material
forms taken by what is provided and contestation over provision (as with free or
subsidised water, regulation, etc). And, of course, similar considerations apply to the
specificities of housing provision given its diverse forms of supply, tenure and
financing. Most striking is that the financialisation of housing has advanced on the
back of private homeownership, to which commodified housing production and
access has been secondary, as evidenced by the state’s role in building the privatised
housing stock in the UK and Poland and in allocating low income housing in South
Africa. This reflects the opportunities for mortgage lending and secondary mortgage
trading created by private homeownership – forms of financialisation that can
develop with relative independence from commodified housing production.
5. From Economic to Social Reproduction
Such observations lead to three important implications concerning financialisation.
The first is that the prodigious expansion and proliferation of financial markets over
the past three decades is indicative of a secular, if irregular, trend of expansion of
fictitious capital alongside and, arguably, at the net expense of the real economy.
How else are we to describe, let alone explain, the disproportionate growth and
spread of both financial markets and rewards (and corresponding inequalities)? Slow
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growth relative to the post-war boom as well as the crisis and recession that have
followed it have, after all, occurred despite this prodigious expansion of finance and
otherwise extraordinarily favourable conditions for both growth and productivity
increase.31
Second, and as already noted in relation to housing, a standard mechanism for such
effects is for finance to be drawn into the sale and resale of assets that have claims
to incomes. This can lead to speculative bubbles and to pressures to sustain the
processes involved through short-term profit-making and/or -taking. Such may be
realised through cost-cutting at the expense of wages, working conditions, long-
term investment and so on. The important point here is the greater pressure for
short-term profit-making at the expense of longer-term and broader considerations,
not least since wage-cutting, etc, are hardly unique to the era of financialisation and
otherwise absented from the rationale of capitalist production and reproduction. The
presumption is that financialisation induces poorer economic and social
performance at many levels, if not for everyone all of the time. From this, it follows
that the consequences of financialisation are differentiated by the sources of income
upon which it depends and how it depends upon them, i.e. how these incomes are
generated, and this cannot be derived from the presence of financialisation as such.
We can see this by contrasting the consequences of financialisation in housing and
water. In the former, the financialisation of income streams arising from mortgage
repayments has fed mortgage markets and speculative house price bubbles. This
has in turn fuelled inequality by expanding the housing wealth of some while driving
up housing costs of others. In other instances, financialisation can be associated
with longer-term investments not least when these can themselves be bundled into
more liquid forms of commercial assets for resale and/or access to enhanced levels
of credit. For water, companies are able to issue bonds on the basis of identifiable
cash flows from the operating revenues of a segment of a business. Loans are taken
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out on the basis of these future revenue streams. These are used to finance large-
scale, long-term investments, contrary to some degree to the notion that
financialisation involves short-termism at the expense of long-term investment. But
the promise of secure revenues does allow water companies to raise short-term
finance, and there is also evidence that debts have been raised to finance
shareholder distributions, thereby expanding financial profits at the expense of real
investment. The proximate effect is a transfer from the water consumers of the
future to the shareholders of today.
Of course, the financial mechanisms for delivering financial rewards have
themselves become extremely diverse, encompassing huge salaries and bonuses
within the financial sector, as well as returns on various kinds of asset ownership.
These have generated greater levels of inequality, with implications for levels and
composition of demand. In addition, and third, the expansion of finance has been
both intensive (within existing or traditional spheres of operation) as well as
extensive, that is by incorporating activities either where they were previously absent
or where they were not previously subject to incorporation into financialised circuits
(futures markets for commodities, for example, following those of currencies are
notable examples). Housing is illustrative of both, as we have seen intensive
expansion in the form of the growth of secondary mortgage markets attached to
already existing mortgage markets, and extensive expansion through the
incorporation into mortgage markets of sections of the population previously
excluded, most notably through subprime and reverse redlining in the USA. Within
the literature, this expanding and increasing reach has been marked by reference to
the increasing presence of financialisation in both economic and social reproduction.
For economic reproduction, an early insight in the context of financialisation was
provided by reference to the rise of shareholder value, the increasing engagement of
(industrial) corporations in targeting short-term financial as opposed to long-term
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productivity gains, and the increasing reliance of corporations upon profits drawn
from financial dealing as opposed to producing things. In general, emphasis on
corporate financialisation preceded more general accounts (i.e. of credit, the
household and everyday life) by a short if distinct lag.32 Significantly, though, the
literature tends to be very Anglo-American in focus, to some extent reflecting that
the processes of financialisation are themselves more advanced in the USA and the
UK, itself an index of the relative strengths of (global and domestic) financial
interests and their political representation through the state, Engelen et al (2008).
New public management has also been observed, with Skaerbaek and Melander
(2004) pointing to new principles of accounting associated with financialisation and
privatisation, and the corresponding emergence of new actors and interests.
For social, as opposed to narrowly-conceived economic, reproduction,
financialisation has in part been seen to be a consequence of attempts to sustain
(norms of) consumption through increasing borrowing in face of stagnating real
wages (or unemployment), cuts in welfare provision, privatisation of social services
(pensions, housing, health and education) and the interaction between these and the
processes of financialisation. In the lead in this respect has been Lapavitsas’ notion
of exploitation (of us all) through financialisation.33 Whatever its merits otherwise,
this is, however, a misleading account in a number of respects. On the one hand, it
unduly focuses upon the “impoverished”, as it were, for the incidence and even the
drive behind financialisation (of the household), whereas whether in use of credit and
access to financial(ised) assets, the process has arguably been led by, and has
greater incidence with, those on higher incomes (and not driven by low income,
unemployment, limited access to privatised welfare, etc).34 Mortgage lending, for
example, is correlated with income, Santos and Teles (2013) and extending mortgage
lending to less well-off households has proved an on-going problem, Robertson
(2015). On the other hand, as already suggested, not least by reference to ccfcc, the
financialisation of social reproduction is highly contingent upon how finance is
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integrated with provisioning with implications for health, housing and education, let
alone credit card (ab)use, liable to be extremely varied across different households
and (national) locations.35 So the US subprime market was predatory and can
plausibly be regarded as colloquially exploitative due to its punitive and often
outright deceptive repayment structures. But access to a mortgage in the UK is
more associated with access to large capital gains and the accumulation of housing
wealth than it is with default, negative equity, or unmanageable repayments.
Further, social reproduction involves much more than immediate household access
to provisioning. Prominent in the literature has been the reproduction of the spatial
environment. This is reflected through a wide range of studies across different
applications and at different levels of empirical detail, such as Gruffydd Jones (2012)
on third world slums, Baud and Durand (2012) for global retailing, Christophers
(2010, p. 105) for the financialisation of land as “the trend towards treatment of
property as a pure financial asset” rather than for its use,36 Sassen (2010) for sub-
prime as primitive accumulation, Torrance (2009) for urban infrastructure,
Robertson (2012) for ecosystem services, and Amin (2010) for agriculture, the Third
World and primitive accumulation. Financialisation has also been closely linked to
the inadequacies of responses to climate change, Fieldman (2014), Layfield (2013),
Robertson (2012), Sullivan (2013) and Lohmann (2011).
Housing and water are, of course, heavily implicated in the reproduction of the built
environment. Ivanova (2010, p. 398), like many, follows David Harvey, in arguing that,
“The state can temporarily alleviate the tendency to overaccumulation in the primary
circuit of capital by facilitating the switch of resources from industry and
manufacturing into construction and real estate through a variety of public policies,
such as the provision of long-term financing and the willingness to guarantee large-
scale projects”.37 In brief, Harvey’s “capital switching” thesis distinguishes between
primary (commodities), secondary (fixed capital and the built environment) and
46
This project has received funding from the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme
for research, technological development and demonstration under grant agreement no 266800
tertiary (science and technology and social goods) circuits of capital, and argues that
over-accumulation in the first will lead to the channelling of investment into the
second, and so on. That the state is an active agent in this process is borne out by
recent efforts to increase private finance in infrastructure. For example, the
European Investment Plan for Europe includes the European Fund for Strategic
Investments which aims to overcome the current “investment gap” in the European
Union by mobilising private finance for strategic investments in infrastructure.38 In
developing countries the World Bank’s Global Infrastructure Facility has emerged to
match private finance to infrastructure investments.
However, the housing case studies belie the idea of temporary “switching” in
response to over-accumulation in the primary circuit, by paying witness to long-term
economic restructuring characterised by the foregrounding of real estate as a site of
value creation and appropriation (the relative balance between the two being a moot
and contentious point) and the reshaping of the built environment in response to this
restructuring. The reasons for this restructuring are complex, but Haila (1988)
usefully dissects them, starting with the relocation of industrial production to urban
peripheries and emerging economies and consequent restructuring of urban
environments around the service sector. This, in turn, is associated with the
transformation of urban areas into consumption spaces, to which are attached
symbolic meanings. In the context of a growing number of footloose firms and
expanded international capital flows, these processes have served to increase the
ground rents up for grabs in urban centres.
Another idea of Harvey’s is useful in helping to understand these processes. This is
that, in the course of capitalist development, land comes to behave like a financial
asset which is underpinned by rent: “interest-bearing capital circulates through land
markets perpetually in search of enhanced future ground rents”, Harvey (1982, p.
368). It is not just mortgages, then, that are being financialised, but also ground
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rents themselves, as evidenced by the emergence of a number of specialised
institutions for investing in real estate directly. But the relevance of Harvey’s thesis
goes beyond the creation of new financial assets underpinned by rent. Haila also
points to “the spread of a calculating attitude” (1988, p. 91) with respect to land – cc,
if we may – among non-financial agents. For Haila, these include non-financial
firms, who “have begun to require maximum profitability also from their real
property which has until now served as a framework for activity” (p. 92), and the
state, who “[i]n their role as landowners … have recently begun to pursue a new kind
of rationality” (p. 92). The case studies suggest a third such property owner, as
households are also being encouraged to employ a calculating attitude towards their
housing by using it as a basis from which to accumulate and extract value. While we
have stressed that financialisation’s effect on individual subjectivities is complex and
contradictory, a shift towards households treating their housing like a financial asset
is evident across the case studies.
Harvey’s notion of land coming to be treated more like a financial asset more
powerfully captures the structural transformations associated with financialisation
than does capital switching. Nonetheless, the point stands that the channelling of
finance to real estate has had dramatic consequences for both the built environment
and broader economic functioning, and that states have played a substantial role in
this. A good illustration of the latter aspect is given by the active role of the state in
displacing lower income communities from high value land. This was observed in
central urban areas in the UK and Turkey and, in the form of slum clearances, in
Portugal and South Africa and, in all cases, can be understood as serving to enhance
rents and aid their capture.
6. … and Gender
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But reference to social reproduction inevitably raises the issue of gender relations
and how these have interacted with financialisation. To a large extent, as with many
other fields of study, the gender implications of a new concept and new material
developments have been subject to neglect. This does not, however, appear to be
primarily the consequence of gender blindness or oppression as such. Rather, it is
the sheer complexity of what is involved that discourages grand theorising and
generalisation.
Consider, for example, the careful empirical study of the US labour market by
Arestis et al (2014, p. 171/2):
the empirical analysis of this study supports the notion that a growing wage
premium exists for individuals working in managerial and financial occupations over
the period 1983– 2009, and that this growing wage premium is not equally
distributed among all gender and race groups present in the US labor market. For
each ethnic group, men have taken an increasing share of the wage premium. More
generally, white and Hispanic men have enjoyed a disproportionate share of this
wage premium at the expense of black men, white women, and Hispanic women.
Putting it boldly, the theoretical and empirical analyses suggest that financialization
has been neither race nor gender neutral. It has in fact exacerbated gender and
ethnic stratification in the US labor market. From this perspective, the gender and
race stratification effects of the Great Recession are at least in part the long-run
outcome of structural processes generated by the financialization process.
It will surely come as no surprise that they conclude that financialisation has been
associated with, primarily, white male rewards in the wake of growing inequality. But
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how far does this generalise beyond the USA, to other outcomes deriving from
financialisation and to non-economic reproduction?
Such issues are addressed by Adkins and Dever (2014) who, given women’s role in
social reproduction, acknowledge the multiple sources of impact upon gender
relations through financialisation, not least implicitly differentiated by ccfcc as laid
out here and, for them, in conditions of (the crisis of) postfordism. It is far from clear
that the notion of postfordism helps in capturing this complexity, not least as it has
long since gone out of fashion and, unlike the original conception of Fordism (and
regulation) by Aglietta, postfordism has been relatively aloof from the role of finance.
This does raise the issue of whether financialisation is distinctive in its implications
for gender and, if so, in what way. This is equally brought out by Allon (2014, p. 17) in
drawing contrast with a stylised account of an earlier era for which, “The
Fordist/Keynesian welfare state was underpinned by a series of gender, sexual and
racial norms, including a gendered division of labour premised on the free gift of
women’s unpaid domestic work.” By contrast post-Fordist financialisation is
perceived to break down these norms if not the household itself, p. 20:
This entanglement of financial markets with spaces and activities not previously
associated with processes of calculation, measurement and economic value
suggests a considerable challenge to received understandings of the relationships
between gender and economy, production and reproduction, and life and labour. But
perhaps the greatest challenge is to the traditional identity of the home. Long
represented as a realm of freedom beyond the market and state, and therefore a site
beyond economic calculation, the home’s identity has frequently been defined in
opposition to the economy … Rather than existing as a refuge from accumulation, the
home has actually been well and truly reconfigured as a new frontier of
accumulation.
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This idea is prominent in the literature on housing asset-based welfare systems. It
views growing homeownership and access to mortgage products as underpinning a
shift towards individualised welfare provision in which asset ownership in general,
and homeownership in particular, are central. Arguably, however, this is an idea that
has more purchase in scholarship, or “financialisation”, and political rhetoric than it
does in reality, Robertson (2014a).
Such an approach parallels the notion that the household has itself become a
financial enterprise, a notion popularised by Bryan and Rafferty (2014). It is certainly
worth questioning whether other developments, even in the earlier period, such as
welfare provision and women’s greater labour market participation, might not be at
least as powerful in transforming the nature of the household, gender relations and
social reproduction (and whether gendered norms within the household both persist
and/or are transformed in conjunction with financialisation). In short, possibly
uncontroversially, the relationships between gender and financialisation and
economic and social reproduction need to be disentangled through close attention to
the different aspects and processes involved. To the extent that financialisation is
associated with increasing debts, a feature of both housing and water in several of
the case studies, this is more prevalent in single parent households and these are
predominantly headed by women.
More generally, there is, then, drawing upon the discussion so far, a recognisable
tension in commitment to a universal theory of money, suitably developed to
incorporate ccfcc, and, whether through financialisation or otherwise,
acknowledgement that monetary and financial relations are extremely diverse or, as
a preferred terminology, “variegated”.39 Choice of this term reflects a wish to avoid
reliance upon ideal types, as for example with the terminologically close but distinct
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notion of varieties of capitalism.40 The need is to be able both to identify general
underlying determinants – whether as structures, processes, agents and/or
relations – and to attach them to diverse outcomes. Accordingly, financialisation is
uneven in its nature, incidence and impact,41 and unsurprisingly, much the same will
be true, if not more so, of its associated provisions and cultures.
7. Concluding Remarks
This paper has sought to engage with both the array of trends and phenomena that
constitute financialisation, and how they have been reckoned with through
scholarship on “financialisation”, in light of case studies on financialisation of
housing and water. The core of our theoretical analysis is that as finance is
underpinned by money, which is itself constituted by commodified relations, so
financialisation is underpinned by transformations of provisioning across the
categories abbreviated as ccfcc. These transformations have opened up new income
streams to financial capital, which has in turn transformed these income streams
into financial assets to be traded. This gives rise to many of the phenomena
associated with financialisation – most notably, the intensive and extensive
expansion of finance into economic and social reproduction, and the expansion of the
financial at the expense of the real economy. But the examples drawn from housing
and water caution against excessive generalisation in drawing conclusions from our
analyses. The nature of ccfcc, its relationship to finance, and the extent to which it
has facilitated financialisation all exhibit wide variation across both housing and
water and the different case studies. The implications for social and economic
reproduction and for real investment similarly vary. All of this emphasises the need
to couple the theoretical precepts drawn from our discussion of money and ccfcc
with attention to the variegated forms taken, and influences exerted, by
financialisation in practice.
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Elsewhere, in addition, it has been argued that financialisation lies at the heart of
neoliberalism and explains its longevity, Bayliss et al (2015). But, of course, the
material culture of neoliberalism extends far beyond that of mere money. Or does it?
In his classic novel of the Great Depression The Grapes of Wrath, Steinbeck
observes, “this tractor does two things - it turns the land and turns us off the land”,
and his novel charts the material cultures of those dispossessed, not only their
heroic attempts to survive and prosper but also the material support they receive on
occasion as well as the violence and stigma attached to their plight. But the author
also makes clear that behind the tractor and the land lies the banker whose bottom
line must be met irrespective of the economic and social costs.
To some extent, The Grapes of Wrath might be taken as a metaphor for the
imperatives of financialisation. But like all metaphors, it has its strengths and
weaknesses. As we have sought to indicate, financialisation proceeds both directly
and indirectly through many channels attached to ccfcc and through the making and
application of fictitious capital in economic and social reproduction. But such
abstract considerations akin to a set of impersonal forces are realised concretely in
the diverse outcomes attached to housing and water which, by necessity, cannot be
taken as the equivalent of the tractor and the land in Great Depression America.
What has been mercilessly exposed through our own and others’ study of
“financialisation” is that it is much easier to point to the grave dysfunctions of
financialisation in practice, and to propose remedies for them, than it is to build the
political support for policy alternatives.
1 For the Case Study reports (D8.25), see Bayliss (2014 and 2015a); Çelik, Topal and Yalman (2015);
Isaacs (2015); Lis (2015a; 2015b); Robertson (2014b); Santos, Serra and Teles (2015); Teles (2015);
Yilmaz and Çelik (2015). For synthesis papers (D8.26) see Bayliss (2015b) and Robertson (2015).
2 But see Magdoff and Sweezy (1987).
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3 See Cornwall and Eade (eds) (2010).
4 For Michell and Toporowski (2014, p. 80), seeking deeper explanations for the increased role of
finance and its relationship to capitalist enterprises:
Without identifying and explaining those key relationships, “financialization” cannot provide
any insight beyond the evidence adduced for its existence. The challenge for users of that
term is to provide analysis that reveals more than just what is already known. Lacking a clear
account of the market processes of banking and finance (credit, credit innovation, and
hedging), and banking and financial policy, financialization joins “neoliberalism” and
“globalization” as a predicament that disempowers us. It disempowers us by distracting us
from a necessary intellectual enquiry with an unformed and shadowy conclusion.
Unsurprisingly, they conclude, “For this reason, the understanding of finance requires the
abandonment of financialization as a project of intellectual inquiry”, p. 80.
5 If not the third, as social capital has studiously avoided what are possibly its most obvious
application, national and international elites in general, and those attached to finance in particular.
See Fine (2010a) and Vitali et al (2011). See also Sawyer (2014, p. 13) who observes in quoting Epstein
(2005, p. 3), “In short, this changing landscape has been characterized by the rise of neoliberalism,
globalization and financialization”.
6 See Michell and Toporowski (2014) who see “financialisation” as a neologism, reflecting over-
reaction to the greater presence of finance but its neglect in the past. See also Christophers (2013).
7 Significantly, in light of our next two points, they continue:
we emphasize the integral role of finance in connecting the entangled geographies of the
economic to the social, the cultural, and the political. In the wake of various "turns" in the
discipline, we develop this integrationist approach to finance in ways that retain political
economies of states, markets, and social power in our interpretations of geographically
uneven development. In this article, we discuss the plural nature of emergent work on
financialization and develop three analytical themes to shape our discussion of
financialization. Next, we elaborate our analytical approach by warning against functional,
political, and spatial disconnections traced in the literature on the geographies of money. we
develop this integrationist approach to finance in ways that retain political economies of
states, markets, and social power in our interpretations of geographically uneven
development … we discuss the plural nature of emergent work on financialization and
develop three analytical themes to shape our discussion of financialization. Next, we
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elaborate our analytical approach by warning against functional, political, and spatial
disconnections traced in the literature on the geographies of money. We then explore how
financialization is broadening and deepening the array of agents, relations, and sites that
require consideration in economic geography and is generating tensions between territorial
and relational spatialities of geographic differentiation.
8 The breakdown of the previously complacent New Consensus Macroeconomics without replacement
in sight other than to appeal to greater realism, to more and more severe market imperfections, and
to behavioural economics is indicative of the inadequacy of the mainstream both before and after the
crisis. See Deliverables for Work Package 12, in preparation.
9 Or TA2, see Fine (2015) most recently for example, with emphasis upon orthodoxy’s undue reliance
upon use of production and utility functions, and preoccupation with optimisation, efficiency and
equilibrium, respectively, for apparatus and architecture.
10 For them, this involves the conjunctural specificity of mass (40%) participation of households in
financial dealings of various sorts, the proliferation of financial intermediation, and the increasing
distance between financial and productive assets, leading it to be “certainly helpful to distinguish
between intermediary elite groups and financialized masses”, pp. 26-7.
11 See also Johal et al (2014) for use of bricolage in the context of the building and exercise of the
power of finance.
12 Our own approach draws upon Marxist political economy and its complex theory of forms of capital
in exchange. For a simple exposition, see Fine and Saad-Filho (2010) but also Fine (1985/6 and 1988)
and especially Fine (2014). For other views from within political economy, see the contributions to the
symposium in the same issue as the latter.
13 Commodity, commodity form and commodity calculation.
14 Thus, as Botta et al (2015, p. 2) implicitly observe, financialisation involves the “commodification of
financial relationships”, p. 2, but this necessarily requires previous commodification of non-financial
relationships. Hence, as suggested by Callaghan (2015, pp. 333/4), citing (Apeldoorn and Horn, 2007,
p. 215), “financialization depends on marketization, defined as the creation of regulatory
preconditions for markets to arise and develop, thereby extending the market mechanism to new
areas of social life”. On the latter, see below.
15 As Dodd (1994) observes of Simmel (1900), the latter’s argument around money is not that money
homogenises everything. Rather, the idea that money can do so is extremely powerful and very much
enters our understanding of capitalist society. See below and also Gronow (1997) and discussion in
Fine (2002).
16 See Fine (2013, p. 16):
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For Margaret Radin (1996), in her book, Contested Commodities, the argument is put forward
that the treatment in the field of economics and law, inspired by economics imperialism, has
the effect of producing attitudes to sexual assault as if it were reducible to a violation of
property with correspondingly damaging effects on incidence. A rather different but classic
example of collective ethics is the Gift Relationship of Richard Titmuss (1970), and the free
donation of blood in the UK that is more effective in soliciting supply than if it were paid for. I
am an example myself. I would not have given blood if I were paid for it just as I will not
submit to journals that charge for submission nor referee for those that pay for review since I
consider these to be a collective intellectual responsibility. Of course, there are those who
hold different views, especially those academics who receive huge fees for promoting the
liberalisation of financial markets, secure in the certainty that if someone is willing to pay so
much for this knowledge, that is what it must be worth with the added comfort that
Gresham’s law of the bad driving out the good money from circulation does not apply to
knowledge any more than it does to efficient markets. The ethics of such plutonomy within
the economics profession has been cruelly exposed, especially within the United States
[Epstein and Carrick-Hagenbarth (2010 and 2012), Fullbrook (2012), Ferguson (2010) and
Mirowski (2010)]. It is complemented by an ethics of agnotology, the more or less deliberate
spread of ignorance about matters economic [Mirowski (2010) and Mirowski and Nik-Khah
(2012)].
17 Note that the origins of Zelizer’s approach lie in the transition from the valued to the invaluable
child, although valuing (quality of) life and limb has inevitably become standard in cost-benefit
analysis and compensation claims.
18 For a, possibly unwitting update of Zelizer from within a performativity perspective, see Langley
(2008, p. 6) for whom it is denied that finance is spaceless and timeless, with its being de-
territorialised and dematerialised particularly in relation to globalisation. Instead, a corrective is
provided by, “Distinct cultural rituals, rules and symbols; relationships of trust, friendship, and
cooperation; the acceptance of models, formulas, and calculations; and trading floors of computer
screens, interlinked by high-technology communication channels”.
19 Thus, the rigid separation between form and content (and so the making of social relations) is a
false one, as was acknowledged long ago in Marx’s theory of commodity fetishism.
20 Note also that the universal nature of money leads to the illusion that barter is simply commodity
exchange without money and, vice versa, that commodity exchange is a more sophisticated, extensive
and efficient form of barter. It is more appropriate to see barter and commodity exchange as simply
different from each other, Lapavitsas (2003), rather than either as an evolutionary sequence or as a
less or a more advanced version of the other.
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21 See Leyshon and Thrift (2007) for emphasis upon securitisation as the new driving force of
capitalism, and Pike and Pollard (2010) for securitisation of brands and even the weather. And for
corresponding financialisation of the university, see Engelen et al (2014) and Morrish and Sauntson
(2013).
22 Note that for Beckert (2011, p. 759), this leads to the idea that prices derive from social relations so
that “the outcome of struggles between market actors taking place within market fields is the
sociological vantage point from which to analyse price formation” with the consequence that more or
less everything is price-forming including networks, just norms, power (of cartels), trust, status,
institutions, legitimacy, meaning, preferences, expectations, and so on. Indeed, Bourdieu is quoted to
the effect that, “It is not prices that determine everything, but everything that determines prices”.
Ironically, there is nothing in this to bother the mainstream neoclassical economist. In contrast here,
the position is that these elements attached to systems of provision are formative of the material
culture underpinning use, as opposed to, exchange values.
23 The following discussion is based on the case study reports, Robertson (2014b), Santos et al (2015),
Issacs (2015), Lis (2015) and Celik et al (2015), as well as the sectoral synthesis report, Robertson
(2015).
24 This is the buying and selling of water access entitlements and allocations.
25 Indaqua is owned by Portuguese shareholders Mota Engil, Soares da Costa and Hidrante; Aquapor,
formerly part of the state-owned utility AdP, was sold in 2007 to a consortium of Portuguese
investors, DST and ABB. A third significant investor in the sector, AGS, was owned by Somague, a
Spanish subsidiary of Sacyr Valleheremoso but in 2014 was sold to Marubeni.
26 For Marx, this is the basis of interest bearing capital for which see Fine (2014), Fine and Saad-Filho
(2010) and Fine (1985/6 and 1988) for exposition and for what follows.
27 “BEWG successfully acquired Portugal assets of Veolia Water” Press Release, Beijing Enterprises
Water Group Ltd, Hong Kong, 25 March 2013.
28 Incorporated in Bermuda as an exempted company with limited liability and the shares are listed on
the Hong Kong Stock Exchange.
29 “BEWG successfully acquired Portugal assets of Veolia Water” Press Release, Beijing Enterprises
Water Group Ltd, Hong Kong, 25 March 2013.
30 Author’s calculation based on data from company reports.
31 Ashman and Fine (2013, p. 157) refer to favourable “‘fundamentals’ for capitalism in terms of
availability of new technologies, expansion and weakening of global and national labour forces, and
the triumph of neoliberalism in political and policy arenas”.
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32 For this and a sample of continuing literature, see special issue of Economy and Society, vol 29, no
1, 2000, Kadtler and Sperling (2002), Perotti and Gelfer (2001), Krippner (2011), O’Sullivan (2008),
Muellerleile (2009), Engelen and Grote (2009), Zademach (2009), Buhlmann et al (2012).
33 Although, for Lapavitsas, financialisation also ranges over new roles for banks and non-financial
enterprises as well as households. For a critique, see Fine (2010b). See also Soederberg (2013) for an
account of the “debtfare state and the credit card industry”.
34 See Beaverstock et al (2013) for the rise of the super rich and their access to financial products. See
also Lysandrou (2011 and 2011/12) and Goda and Lysandrou (2013).
35 With an increasing financialisation of micro-credit, see Bateman (2010), Weber (2014) and Mader
(2014).
36 See also Robertson (2015) and, for the heavy presence of financialisation in the “land grab
literature”, see Isakson and Ryan (2014), Dixon (2014), Fairbairn et al (2014), Fairbairn (2014) and
McMichael (2012), itself indicative of how financialisation is a hot issue for hot issues!
37 And the list could go on, in respect of the spatial and otherwise (although integral to one another
even if finance and financialisation are in some sense disembodied whilst also needing to come down
to earth). See Locke (2014) for differences between German and US financialisation, with differential
impacts upon income distribution and education, Kaika and Ruggeiro (2013) for the transformation of
a Milanese industrial district, Theurillat et al (2010) for differential impact of pension funds on
property development, and Weber (2010) for Chicago’s securitisation of tax revenue to fund urban
development. See later for financialisation of agriculture more generally.
38 http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/jobs-growth-investment/plan/efsi/index_en.htm
39 See Jessop (2014) for example. Early use of the notion of variegated capitalism is to be found in
Peck and Theodore (2007), and see also Brenner et al (2010) for variegated neoliberalism.
40 For a critique of which, with application to South Africa, especially in the context of financialisation,
see Ashman and Fine (2013).
41 The uneven and diverse nature of financialisation is more observed, the more analysis is extended
beyond its Anglo-Saxon origins. See, for example, Lapavitsas and Powell (2013), Becker et al (2010),
Becker (2014), Erturk (2010), Garcia-Arias (2014), Levy-Orlik (2014), Datz (2014) in context of pensions,
Zhang (2014) for East Asia in context of political influences, Carroll and Jarvis (2014) for Asia, Rethel
and Sinclair (2014) for financialisation as an avenue for the developmental to become an
entrepreneurial state in Asia, and Bonizzi (2014) for an overview in the context of development.
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